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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(1) Can "Due Process", in this case, omit trial upon the facts? 
(2) Is just any action under Rule 1 (liberally construed courts) 
lawful? 
(3) Are slander and libel proper tools for the State to use? 
(4) Is it proper for the State to contrive unsubstantiated 
material as evidence? To fabricate an entity in Michael Ford and 
bestow upon him the rights of biological father? 
(5) Was it error for the Juvenile Court to deny me the right, or 
the ability, to enter all my objections so they could be responded 
to? 
(6) Does "Case Law" on Family, Husband and Wife, and etc. actually 
apply to this case? A case with no family involvement? 
(7) With all the undue activity on the part of those who have 
conspired with the Crittenden family; Is it actually possible to 
F/UJU I 
consider any aspect of the States case against the Winfield 
Schoolcraft family as fact? 
(8) Does the Court ordering of two Psychologicals done by PHD's 
for Schoolcraft, both good/ and none for the Crittendensf constitute 
prejudicial and unequal treatment? 
(9) Is it proper for the State to deny a relationship and then 
argue that because of that lack of relationship custody can not be 
granted? 
(10) Is it proper in a state that is predominately Mormon, for a 
Mormon family to have an advantage in gaining custody over the child 
of someone else? By being Mormon/ are they considered to be better 
parents? 
CITATION TO OPINION OP COURT OF APPEALS 
It was stated that "the foster family and Schoolcraft were on 
equal footing to seek legal custody, neither having any greater 
legal right under color of law " 
(1) Schoolcraft/ had at least the rights in the beginning before 
the Crittendens entered the picture with the conspiracy. 
(2) The Utah Supreme Court/ the last time through/ gave 
Schoolcraft some rights. 
(3) Any rights that the foster family have were achieved through 
foul play. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction under the constitution of 
the State of Utah, Article 1, Section 7, & 11. Because of the very 
basic nature of this casef and the unconstitutional actions of the 
State of Utah against the family of Winfield Schoolcraft. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
ARTICLE 1/ SECTION 1, Inherent and inalienable rights. SECTION 4, 
Religious liberty. 
In my culture, my inherent and inalienable right extends 
also to my family, as my family. My religious liberty is my 
religious obligation, to raise my family. Teaching my son the value 
of Gods commandments. How can the Mormon family who is willing to 
conspire with the State in fraudulent activity teach a child good 
spiritual and moral values? 
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 7, Due process of law: 
No one will be deprived without due process of law. 
Can due process of law be made up of fraudulent entities and 
activities? 
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 11, Courts open — Redress of injuries: 
"Due process of law" Without unnecessary delay? My son is 
now 6 years old. I started fighting for him when he was 6 months and 
I found him in Ogden. 
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 27, Fundamental rights: 
The Schoolcraft family rights, all priorities fundamental 
and Christian, Have been violated by the State of Utah. 
ARTICLE 3, SECTION; Religious toleration: 
This Mormon community is not tolerant of my religious 
obligation and desires, to and for my son Joshua. 
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RULE 52 
QUOTE; (a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without 
a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts 
etc. 
The three attorneys, with unanimity as if they had conspired 
together in the Court of Appeals this time arround, have taken the 
following part of paragraph "(a)" out of context, quote; "...Finding 
of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witness." 
The Court Of Appeals, the last time around, on appeal from 
Judge Neweys Court, gave Michael Ford some degree of status in the 
court records. This was in error, as Judge Newey found Michael Ford 
to be hearsay from the mouth of Stanley Swedin. Transcript page 60 
Judge VanDyke read Judge Neweys Paragraph 8 for the record. On page 
82 & 83 Stanley Swedin could produce no evidence of Michael Ford. 
But; Like any good gossip, Michael Ford has attained biological 
father status in the Crittendens petition for adoption, and also in 
other documents. 
Several times in the first paragraph of rule 52, the word fact 
or facts appears. And in the context of; "upon the facts", "find the 
facts", "finding of fact", etc., Because; To be valid, The Court 
Must Find The Facts. I am sorry that I need to be so emphatic. But 
up to now, I have faced a lot of song and dance, void of facts, from 
those who oppose my family's unity. 
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RULE 1 
In part, quote; ...They shall be liberally construed to secure 
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. 
This is the last sentence of paragraph (a). There is nothing 
prior to this last sentence, in the paragraph, that contradicts it. 
The State employees who participated in this action with the 
Crittenden family, and the Crittenden family, did not intend to 
abide by this rule. At the time of Judge Neweys Court the Crittenden 
family had no standing. They had not yet formed the bond with Joshua 
that they claimed later. Because they had no standing, they did not 
provide themselves with an attorney until four and a half years 
later. Yet; It was in Judge Neweys Court that the Crittenden 
relatives showed up in a large number to impress the court in favor 
of John and Colleen Crittenden adopting. Transcript page 180. 
At this time I was married to Joshua's biological mother and I 
at least had the standing accorded me by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Without intentional delaying tactics, the Crittendens would not have 
gained standing of any kind. 
RULE 9 
Paragraph (b) & (j) see addendum. One of the delaying tactics 
was the use of "LIBEL and SLANDER", resulting in "FRAUD" that has 
been on going for the last five and a half years. Transcript page 
37. 
And on page 119, lines 9 & 10 Mr Parmley says, at the prospect 
of actually discussing the truth behind the slander, Quote; I'm not 
going to get into the details of that, Your Honor. I don't care to— 
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The state does not care to have the truth about the slander 
known, as it may render the slander useless as a tool to use against 
the Schoolcraft family. Also I see no need for the innocent to run, 
it is better to stay and fight, even if it is the State of Utah that 
is making this attack. 
RULE 8 
Quote; (f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be 
construed as to do substantial justice. 
There is no justice, when the states pleadings were designed 
to delay justice, and buy time so that the Crittendens can gain 
standing. 
I have been denied a relationship with my son. It has been 
argued that a lack of relationship means a lack of standing. 
Transcript page 222. This situation was contrived by those that 
conspired to buy standing for the Crittendens. 
OBJECTION 
It was error for Judge VanDyke's Court to deny me the right, 
or the ability, to enter all my objections, so that they could be 
properly responded to. My "RECORD of OBJECTION 1991" is in the 
addendum. My attempt to enter these objections starts on page 36 Of 
the transcript, and in some form or another continues throughout. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE; Richard A. Parmley, Deputy County Attorney 
for Weber County, boldly displayed the States1 prejudice, as seen 
all through the transcript. 
(1) On page 116 lines 7 to 12, and page 117 lines 2 to 22 of the 
transcript, Mr. Parmley attempts to give the court a poor impression 
of Mr. Schoolcraft's work history, and as anyone can see, Mr Parmley 
has nothing to substantiate his point of view, neither does he have 
any knowledge of the subject. 
(2) On page 24 line 18 to 25, and page 25 line 1 to 11 of the 
transcript, Mr Parmley is arguing to limit Mr Schoolcraft's 
presentation to as little as possible. Also page 37 line 14 to 25, 
and page 38 line 1 to 5, also limiting Mr. Schoolcraft's 
presentation to as little as possible. Also page 49 line 7 to 9. 
(3) On page 55 line 4 to 9, Mr. Parmley is objecting to Mr. 
Schoolcraft's Objections. 
(4) On page 61 line 1 & 2, Mr. Parmley is objecting to Mr. 
Schoolcraft's questions of Stanley Swedin about the truth of Michael 
Fords existence, quote "on behalf of the State". Mr. Parmley has 
been party to keeping the truth from being told. 
(5) Mr. Parmley's cross examination of Stanley Swedin starts on 
page 74 of the transcript, and it is apparent that Mr. Parmley is 
Mr. Schoolcraft's adversary. 
(6) On page 109 Mr, Parmley cross examine Winfield Schoolcraft. 
Once again the adversary appears on behalf of the State. Notice also 
that Mr. Parmley does not cross examine the state's choices as 
parents for Joshua, the Crittendens, However; On page 223 line 1 to 
20 
Mr. Parmley clearly expresses the State's choice of parents for 
Joshua, the foster home where Joshua has spent most of his life so 
far, the Crittendens. 
CLINICALLY LICENSED SOCIAL WORKER; In the State's direct examination 
m • • • i . 1 i . • i 
of Cindi Lundquist, by Mr. Parmley (Ms. Lundquist is a witness 
called by the state). 
(1) The general overall sound of Ms. Lundquist's testimony is 
favorable to an apparent state of well-being for Joshua. But; on 
page 199, lines 2 & 3, Ms. Lundquist testifies, "Well, he was posed 
to me that if I would do a quick evaluation of J.W.F." etc. 
(2) Page 206, lines 24 & 25, "I saw him only on a limited time," 
etc. 
(3) Page 208, lines 7 & 8, "And, again, it was a limited amount of 
time,'' etc. 
(4) Page 210, line 2 to 4, "Well, again, my evaluation is very 
limited It's not as in-depth as I would have done on some home 
evaluations, due to time restraints.1 
(5) This; The only evidence of anything psychological presented on 
behalf of the Crittendens and it was on Joshua's well-being, not 
having anything to do with the Crittenden's psychological profile. 
On page 224, line 17 to 21, I (Winfield Schoolcraft) expressed my 
concern "Now, but I don't know what will happen when he gets to 
learn some mature adult ethics. I really don't know. And I'd like to 
state that that is an area that hasn't been touched yet. There's 
nothing in here been covered about the adult ethics of the foster 
parents. I tried to bring it in earlier," etc.. 
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OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL; 
(1) On the 20th day of February 1991, I Winfield Schoolcraft filed 
a complaint with the office of Bar Counsel, alleging misconduct on 
the part of Jane Marquardt, Attorney, in that she ignored the 
finding of the lower court and used unsubstantiated matter; namely 
the existence of one called Michael Ford, to influence higher court 
findings. 
(2) After corresponding with Ms. Marquardt and not finding 
anything to substantiate the existence of Michael Ford, the Bar 
Counsel made a finding. 
(3) On April 23ed, 1991, Stephen A. Trost, (Bar Counsel) found 
that Jane Marquardt did not violate any of her ethical obligations 
as an attorney, and dismissed the complaint. 
(4) Copies of the complaint and the finding are attached as 
evidence of the States prejudice that goes beyond the actions of the 
attorney for the State, Richard Parmley. 
OFFICE OF LIABILITY MANAGEMENT, Department of Human Services; 
(1) On the 5th day of March, 1991, I Winfield Schoolcraft filed a 
complaint, alleging misconduct on the part of Stan Swedin, DFS, in 
that he produced unsubstantiated matter in which to unduly influence 
the court system. 
(2) On March 14, 1991, Jack L. Green replied to me that his office 
is taking no action for or against the actions of Mr. Stanley Swedin. 
(3) Copies of the complaint and the letter of March 14th by Mr, 
Green are attached as evidence of additional State prejudice over 
and above that expressed by the attorney for the State, Richard 
Parmley. 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT; 
(1) The Complaint to the Federal Court was much like the Docketing 
Statement to the Court of Appeals. I tried to express that this was 
not a case of child custody as much as it was a case of wrong doing 
on the part of Utah State Officials in concert with citizens. In a 
pretense that I have made no charges of wrong doing, United States 
District Judge, David K. Winder, dismissed the complaint without a 
hearing as if it were just a child custody case. This pretense 
cannot continue. I have a God given obligation to do the best that I 
can for Joshua. And; those who have used dishonest means must have 
only self serving motives. How can I quit? Since Judge VanDyke's 
Court I have increased my efforts, and I must increase them even 
more. 
(2) None of the replies to the complaint addressed the issues as 
set forth in that complaint. The issues were and still are child 
stealing, fraud, and other officious activity. 
(3) The State of Utah has failed to police their own wrong doers 
in this matter. Only an arbitrary and despotic Government could 
object to the truth and defend their own peoples ability; as if it 
were a right, to fill the state court records with fiction. 
(4) This Federal Court section is included to show that the States 
prejudice has gone so far as to reach the Federal Court that resides 
in the State of Utah. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL; 
(1) Two psychologicals for Winfield Schoolcraft. No psychologicals 
for John or Colleen Crittenden, the States1 choice as parents for 
Joshua. 
(2) The claim for the Crittendens was that they have had many 
psychologicals, because they were foster parents. But; No 
psychological was ever submitted to the court. They only presented 
the unsubstantiated claim. It was claimed that the testimony of 
Cindi Lundquist, whose degrees are in social work, was a 
psychological on the Crittendens behalf. Ms. Lundquistfs testimony I 
have covered in the section called CLINICALLY LICENSED SOCIAL 
WORKER. Ms Lundquist only gave testimony about Joshua. And not as 
in-depth as she would have done, as she testified. 
(3) Winfield Schoolcraft submitted two psychologicals, both were 
done by men with Ph.D.s in psychology. Copies of both of these 
psychologicals are attached. Both of Winfield Schoolcraft's 
psychologicals were Court ordered. 
THE MULTIRACIAL SUBJECT; 
(1) When the racial appearance of the child is used for a reason 
to remove one white appearing parent and replace that parent with 
another white parent the rational becomes very weak. This is the 
arbitrary removing and replacing of parents that is to implement the 
bias, or the prejudice of the State. On page 96 of the transcript, 
starting with line 6, is a discussion on this subject. How does all 
the discussion in the world justify removing white parents so that 
an influential white family can adopt? 
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(2) It Has been asserted by the state that Linda Schoolcraft and 
Winfield Schoolcraft are both pure white. I have quoted Judge 
VanDyke's statement earlier about those who assert, should prove. In 
actuality Linda Schoolcraft does not look as white as Dinah Shore, 
whose first child was black from her ancestry; not that of her 
Russian husband. Dinah Shore was discussed in Judge VanDyke's Court 
with out any objection, on page 96 of the transcript. 
(3) When the only reason for discussing a child's racial 
background is to arbitrarily remove one white parent and install 
another white parent, (the States1 choice) the child's color then 
becomes irrelevant. Such arbitrary actions are prejudicial and 
unwarranted. 
HOW VALID IS THE BLOOD TEST? 
(1) In the light of what has been done, and to the extent that the 
State has been willing to go with false testimony, how can we depend 
on the validity of the blood test? 
(2) In fact, there has been two court ordered blood tests. The 
first one was the last part of 1986, and the second one was ordered 
and completed early in 1987. Although I objected to the blood test, 
I participated; because I was told that the decision would be 
automatically against me if I did not. 
(3) Jane Marquardt, Guardian Ad Litm, at that time did not find 
the first blood test fit for the purpose desired; Therefore she 
requested a new one. 
(4) The first blood test; Blood was taken from Winfield 
Schoolcraft on 12/3/86, Court order by Weber County Utah Juvenile 
Court. Blood drawn at Oregon Medical Lab, Eugene Oregon, #50 Oakway 
Mall. Julie Revelle admitted me, her supervisor was Norma Lockier. 
My picture was taken and all that was done was witnessed by a fourth 
party. Blood was shipped to Dr. C.W. DeWitt Ph.d., Dept. of 
Pathology, University of Utah Medical Center, Room 5B 210, 50 North 
Medical Dr., Salt Lake City, Utah 84132. A copy of receipt from 
Oregon Medical Laboratories is attached. 
(5) With out any discussion of the findings of the blood test the 
request for a new blood test was made, and so ordered by Judge 
Newey, the Juvenile Court Judge at that tine. The new blood tesc has 
the states approval, because the State uses it just as the State 
uses the alleged Michael Ford and Joshua's alleged racial back 
ground. 
(6) To be able to redo any evidence, (the blood test) until such a 
combination of; people, or circumsrances, become available, so as to 
achieve the States1 prejudice, is unconscionable. 
FAU£ i 4 
(7) I would like to quote one sentence from Judge VanDyke, found 
on page 58 of the transcript/ lines 1 & 2, "The general rule or 
principle is that he who asserts must prove." Now I would quote a 
paragraph from Judge Newey's Memorandum Decision signed by him the 
10th day of februaryf 1987/ "8. That Linda Schoolcraft advised Mr. 
Swedin that a Michael Ford was the father of Joshua Ford on her 
application for Public Assistance.". Those who have asserted the 
existence of Michael Ford gained only hearsay recognition for their 
fabricated entity in Judge Newey's Court. But; The continued and 
repeated use of the name Michael Ford/ as the repetitious beating of 
a drumf has caused a story to be printed in the Pacific Reporter 
(J.W.F. v, SCHOOLCRAFT 763 P.2d 1217) which sounds like Linda 
Schoolcraft and the alleged Michael Ford had some kind of 
relationship. Any person reading this case would assume that Michael 
Ford was real/ because how could the rights be removed from someone 
who did not exist. 
(8) In the petition for adoption on the part of the Crittenden 
family, written by Findley P. Gridley/ Attorney, reads in part/ "2. 
The natural parents of Joshua W. Ford/ Michael Ford and Linda Jan 
Schoolcraft/ abandoned and deserted him on or about December 5/ 
1985"/ Michael Ford has come a long way from fabrication/ to 
hearsay, to flesh and blood, having rights shared with Linda 
Schoolcraft/ the Mother of Joshua. The very name of the case in the 
Pacific Reporter, J.W.F. v, SCHOOLCRAFT, is getting close to 
slander, because Winfield D. Schoolcraft has not been allowed to 
develop a relationship with Joshua, good or bad. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
THE STATES1 PREJUDICE; 
(1) There is a Biblical principle in turning the other cheek. 
Those who take unfair advantage of a person of lessor means will 
invariably grow in confidence when the lessor person turns the other 
cheek. In the book of 2nd Peterf 3rd chapter, 15th verse, it says 
"And account that the long suffering of our Lord is salvation:", The 
entire 3rd chapter is worth reading here. As the Lord has been 
patient with me, I should be patient in affairs regarding those that 
I care for. In my being long suffering, the wrong doing will have 
time to surface, as it has, as it always dose. I would call your 
attention to the 3rd verse; are these not those who are breaking 'the 
commandments of God found in the 20th chapter of Exodus? But; The 
long suffering of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ can be there 
salvation also. 
(2) The prejudice that has, just this year 1991, fully floated to 
the surface can no longer be ignored. The wrong doing has been 
blatantly expressed by more than one State Official. 
(3) I, Winfield Schoolcraft, from the Cascade Mountains of Oregon, 
have been treated by the State of Utah, as some "Country Bumpkin", 
as if unable to understand the fine elements of their prejudice. 
(4) Basically; Prejudice will not function on the truth. Remove 
all unsubstantiated matter from and around this case, with all of 
its1 many case numbers; And the States1 case will collapse. The 
second blood test, which on the surface appears good; Is not good 
because, it has been placed in doubt by the States1 prejudicial 
actions. The bold truth is, that there is nothing, in the states 
case, except its' prejudice. 
_THREE ATTORNEYS; In Juvenile Court on February 14, 1991. 
(1) Jan Arrington, Richard A. Parmley, and Findley P. Gridley, all 
attorneys. And; All standing in opposition to the unity of the 
Winfield Schoolcraft family; All standing in opposition to the 
truth about the existence of Michael Ford; All working on behalf of 
the influential Crittenden family. 
(2) Two attorneys; Paid for with State or County money, Jan 
Arrington and Richard Parmley; Being paid to stand in opposition to 
the Winfield Schoolcraft family unity. 
(3) On the other side of the court room was Winfield D. 
Schoolcraft, not an attorney, asking for the custody of his son 
Joshua. 
ARGUMENT 
Do away with all that is unsubstantiated, and all that is contrived, 
fabricated, and of no substance; and the State has no case against 
uniting Joshua with the Winfield Schoolcraft family. 
CONCLUSION 
MICHAEL FORD THE MYTH; 
(1) Set aside every unsubstantiated aspect of Michael Ford; 
Michael Ford the biological father; Michael Ford in a common law 
relationship with Linda Schoolcraft; Michael Ford's existence. 
THE FRUIT OF THE FORBIDDEN TREE; 
(1) Let those who have been involved in wrongful actions not 
benefit from those actions. Let the Crittenden family not keep that 
which they have gained by conspiring with the State agency. No 
amount of influence, religious or other, should buy for them another 
mans child. 
THE BLOOD TEST; 
(1) There were those who thought that the second blood test was 
true; But, the probability is that it is just as fabricated as 
Michael Ford and all the rights accorded him. The second blood test 
has the same reliability as the rest of the State's case. 
(2) I, Winfield D. Schoolcraft move to set aside the findings of 
the second blood test. I have always held Joshua out to be my own, 
as he well could be. 
CUSTODY 
(1) I also move to set aside the Crittenden adoption, as it was 
based on wrong doing by both the Crittenden family and the State of 
Utah. 
(2) And please grant Joshua to his rightful family, the 
Schoolcraft family. 
Signed this^3 day of January, 1992 
Winfield D. Schoolcraft 
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APPENDIX INDEX 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 52 1 PAGE 
RULE 1 1 PAGE 
RULE 8 1 PAGE 
RULE 9 1 PAGE 
RECORD OF OBJECTION, 1986 1 PAGE 
RECORD OF OBJECTION, 1991 5 PAGES 
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THE OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL, COMPLAINT AND REPLY 2 PAGES 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 PAGE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, 1991 5 
Rule 52 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 500 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts with-
out a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its con-
clusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be en-
tered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for find-
ings are not necessary for purposes of review. Find-
ings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly errone-
ous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the wit-
nesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that 
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the find-
ings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and re 
corded in open court following the close of the evi 
dence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of de 
cision filed by the court. The trial court need not en 
ter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings 
on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement 
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted 
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the 
motion i^fra^d on more than one ground. 
aendment. upon motion ot a party made not 
later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court 
may amend its findings or make additional findings 
and may amend the judgment accordingly. The mo-
tion may be made with a motion for a new trial pur-
suant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in 
actions tried by the court without a jury, the question 
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the find-
ings may thereafter be raised whether or not the 
party raising the question has made in the district 
court an objection to such findings or has made either 
a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a 
motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact 
and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties 
to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the 
trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in 
the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 53. Masters. 
(a) Appointment and compensation. Any or all 
of the issues in an action may be referred by the court 
to a master upon the written consent of the parties, or 
the court may appoint a master in an action, in accor-
dance with the provisions of Subdivision (b) of this 
rule. As used in these rules the word "master" in-
cludes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner. The 
compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed 
by the court, and shall be charged upon such of the 
parties or paid out of any fund or subject matter of the 
action, which is in the custody and control of the 
court as the court may direct. The master shall not 
retain his report as security for his compensation; but 
when the party ordered to pay the compensation al-
lowed by the court does not pay it after notice and 
within the time prescribed by the court, the master is 
entitled to a writ of execution against the delinquent 
party. 
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the 
jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues 
are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury 
save in matters of account, a reference shall, in the 
absence of the written consent of the parties, be made 
only upon a showing that some exceptional condition 
requires it. 
(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master 
may specify or limit his powers and may direct him to 
report only upon particular issues or to do or perform 
particular acts or to receive and report evidence onlv 
and may fix the time and place for beginning and 
closing the hearings and for the filing of the master's 
report. Subject to the specifications and limitations 
stated in the order, the master has and shall exercise 
the power to regulate all proceedings in every hear 
ing before him and to do all acts and take all mea 
sures necessary or proper for the efficient perfor-
mance of his duties under the order. He may require 
the production before him of evidence upon all mat-
ters embraced in the reference, including the produc-
tion of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, and 
writings applicable thereto. He may rule upon the 
admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed bv 
the order of reference and has the authority to put 
witnesses on oath and may himself examine them 
and may call the parties to the action and examine 
them upon oath. When a party so requests, the mas-
ter shall make a record of the evidence offered and 
excluded in the same manner and subject to the same 
limitations as provided in the Utah Rules of Evidence 
for a court sitting without a jury. 
(d) Proceedings. 
(1) Meetings. When a reference is made, the 
clerk shall forthwith furnish the master with a 
copy of the order of reference. Upon receipt 
thereof unless the order of reference otherwise 
provides, the master shall forthwith set a time 
and place for the first meeting of the parties or 
their attorneys to be held within 20 days after 
the date of the order of reference and shall notify 
the parties or their attorneys. It is the duty of the 
master to proceed with all reasonable diligence 
Either party, on notice to the parties and master 
may apply to the court for an order requiring the 
master to speed the proceedings and to make hi* 
report. If a party fails to appear at the time and 
place appointed, the master may proceed ex part* 
or, in his discretion, adjourn the proceedings to a 
future day, giving notice to the absent party of 
the adjournment. 
(2) Witnesses. The parties may procure the 
attendance of witnesses before the master by the 
issuance and service of subpoenas as provided m 
Rule 45. If without adequate excuse a witness 
fails to appear or give evidence, he may be pun-
ished as for a contempt and be subjected to tne 
consequences, penalties, and remedies provide^ 
in Rules 37 and 45. r 
(3) Statement of accounts. When matters or 
accounting are in issue before the master, 
may prescribe the form in which the accoun 
shall be submitted and in any proper case n*a-
require or receive in evidence a statement by 
certified public accountant who is called as a *n 
ness. Upon objection of a party to any ot 
items thus submitted or upon a showing that ^ 
form of statement is insufficient, the master rn . 
require a different form of statement to be n* 
nished, or the accounts or specific items the 
to be proved by oral examination of the accou 
ing parties or upon written interrogatories o 
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PART I. 
SCOPE OF RULES — ONE FORM OF^ 
ACTION. 
Rule 1 General provisions. 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the 
procedure in the Supreme Court, the district courts, 
the circuit courts, and the justice courts of the state of 
Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil 
nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and mi 
all special statutory proceedings, except as governed\ 
by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted 
by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81 
They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every ac-
tion ^ 
Effective date. These rules shall take effect on 
January 1, 1950, and thereafter all laws in conflict 
therewith shall be of no further force or effect They 
govern all proceedings in actions brought after they 
take effect and also all further proceedings in actions 
then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion 
of the court their application in a particular action 
pending when the rules take effect would not be feasi-
ble or would work injustice, in which event the for-
mer pnxedure applies 
(Amended effective Jan 1, 1987 ) 
Rule 2. One form of action. 
There shall be one form of action to be known as 
"civil action " 
PART II. 
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; SERVICE 
OF PROCESS, PLEADINGS, 
MOTIONS AND ORDERS. 
Rule 3. Commencement of action. 
(a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced 
(1) by filing a complaint with the court, or (2) by 
service of a summons together with a copy of the com-
plaint in accordance with Rule 4 If the action is com-
menced by the service of a summons and a copy of the 
complaint, then the complaint, the summons and 
proof of service, must be filed within ten days of such 
service If, in a case commenced under paragraph 
(a)(2) of this rule, the complaint, summons and proof 
of service are not filed within ten days of service, the 
action commenced shall be deemed dismissed and the 
court shall have no further jurisdiction thereof, pro-
vided, however, that the foregoing provision shall not 
change the requirement of Utah Code Ann Section 
12-1-8 (1986) 
(b) Time of jurisdiction. The court shall have ju-
risdiction from the time of filing of the complaint or 
service of the summons and a copy of the complaint 
(Amended effective April 1, 1990) 
Rule 4. Process. 
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be 
signed and issued by the plaintiff or the plaintiffs 
attorney Separate summonses may be signed and 
served 
(b) Time of service. In an action commenced un-
der Rule 3(a)(1), the summons together with a copy of 
the complaint shall be served no later than 120 days 
after the filing of the complaint unless the court al-
lows a longer period of time for good cause shown If 
the summons and complaint are not timely served, 
the action shall be dismmspd witKnnt n»>oi.i/Ji«> «« 
tiative In any action brought against two or more 
defendants on which service has been obtained upon 
one of them within the 120 days or such longer period 
as may be allowed b> the court, the other or others 
may be served or appear at any time prior to trial 
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall 
contain the name of the court, the address of the 
court, the names of the parties to the action and the 
county in which it is brought It shall be directed to 
the defendant, state the name, address and telephone 
number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and other 
wise the plaintiffs address and telephone number It 
shall state the time within which the defendant is 
required to answer the complaint in writing and 
shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do 
*so, judgment by default will be rendered against the 
defendant It shall state either that the complaint is 
on file with the court or that the complaint will be 
filed with the court within ten days of service If ser 
vice is made by publication, the summons shall 
briefly state the subject matter and the sum of monev 
or other relief demanded, and that the complaint is on 
file 
(d) By whom served. The summons and complaint 
may be served in this state or any other state or tern 
tory of the United States, by the sheriff or constable 
or by the deputy of either, by a United States Mar 
shal or by the marshal's deputy, or by any other per 
son 18 years of age or older at the time of service, and 
not a party to the action or a party's attorney 
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be 
made as follows 
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered 
by subparagraphs (2), (3) or (4) below, by deliver 
mg a copy of the summons and/or the complaint 
to the individual personally, or by leaving a cop* 
at the individual's dwelling house or usual place 
of abode with some person of suitable age and 
discretion there residing, or by delivering a cop* 
of the summons and/or the complaint to an agent 
authorized by appointment or by law to receive 
service of process, 
(2) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 
years) by delivering a copy to the infant and also 
to the infant's father, mother or guardian or u 
none can be found within the state, then to an* 
person having the care and control of the infaM 
or with whom the infant resides, or in whose ser 
vice the infant is employed, 
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to 
be of unsound mind or incapable of conducting 
his own affairs, by delivering a copy to the P61^0" 
and to the person's legal representative if one nai 
been appointed and in the absence of such repre-
sentative, to the individual, if any, who has care 
custody or control of the person, 
(4) Upon an individual incarcerated or comtfi£ 
ted at a facility operated by the state or any of» 
political subdivisions, by delivering a copy t° , 
person who has the care, custody, or control 
the individual to be served, or to that P61"?0^ 
designee or to the guardian or conservator of 
individual to be served if one has been app°in 
who shall, in any case, promptly deliver the P 
cess to the individual served, ^ 
(5) Upon any corporation, not herein other* 
provided for, upon a partnership or other uft 
corporated association which is subject to su» , 
der a common name, by delivering a copy tn^
 Qf 
to an officer, a managing or general age** ^ 
tains a cross-claim; a third-party complaint, if a per-
son who was not an original party is summoned un-
der the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party an-
swer, if a third-party complaint is served. No other 
pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may 
order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer. 
(b) Motions, orders and other papers. 
(1) Motions. An application to the court for an 
order shall be by motion which, unless made dur-
ing a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, 
shall state with particularity the grounds there-
for, and shall set forth the relief or order sought. 
The requirement of writing is fulfilled if the mo-
tion is stated in a written notice of the hearing of 
the motion. 
(2) Orders. An order includes every direction 
of the court including a minute order made and 
entered in writing and not included in a judg-
ment. An order for the payment of money may be 
enforced by execution in the same manner as if it 
were a judgment. Except as otherwise specifi-
cally provided by these rules, any order made 
without notice to the adverse party may be va-
cated or modified without notice by the judge 
who made it, or may be vacated or modified on 
notice. 
(3) Hearings on motions or orders to show 
cause. When on the day fixed for the hearing of a 
motion or an order to show cause, the judge be-
fore whom such motion or order is to be heard is 
unable to hear the parties, the matter shall stand 
continued until the further order of the court, or 
it may be transferred by the court or judge to 
some other judge of the court for such hearing. 
(4) Application of rules to motions, orders, 
and other papers. The rules applicable to cap-
tions, signings, and other matters of form of 
pleadings apply to all motions, orders, and other 
papers provided for by these rules. 
(c) Demurrers, pleas, etc., abolished. Demur-
rers, pleas, and exceptions for insufficiency of a plead-
ing shall not be used. 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth 
a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counter-
claim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain 
(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand 
for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself 
entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several differ-
ent types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state 
in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim 
asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon 
which the adverse party relies. If he is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 
as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and 
this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly 
meet the substance of the averments denied. When a 
pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a 
qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much 
of it as is true and material and shall deny only the 
remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith 
to controvert all the averments of the preceding 
pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials 
of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may 
generally deny all the averments except such desig-
nated averments or paragraphs as he expressly ad-
mits; but, when he does so intend to controvert all its 
averments, he may do so by general denial subject to 
the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
.5! 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preced-
ing pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ac-
cord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assump-
tion of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in 
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, 
fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, li-
cense, payment, release, res judicata, statute of 
frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other 
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative de-
fense. When a party has mistakenly designated a de-
fense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a de-
fense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall 
treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper des-
ignation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a 
pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, 
other than those as to the amount of damage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. 
Averments in a pleading to which no responsive 
pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
denied or avoided. 
(V) Pleading to be concise and direct; consis-
tency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be sim-
ple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of 
pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more state-
ments of a claim or defense alternately or hypo-
thetically, either in one count or defense or in 
separate counts or defenses. When two or more 
statements are made in the alternative and one 
of them if made independently would be suffi-
cient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the 
insufficiency of one or more of the alternative 
statements. A party may also state as many sep-
arate claims or defenses as he has regardless of 
consistency and whether based on legal or on eq-
uitable grounds or on both. All statements shall 
be made subject to the obligations set forth in /y • De maa< 
>-J*nlo.l1 f (f) Consti 
(^  shall be so 
Construction of pleadings. All pleadings 
construed as to do substantial justice 
Rule 9. Pleading special matters. 
(a.) (1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the 
capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the au-
thority of a party to sue or be sued in a represen-
tative capacity or the legal existence of an orga-
nized association of persons that is made a party. 
When a party desires to raise an issue as to the 
legal existence of any party or the capacity of any 
party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party 
to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, he 
shall do so by specific negative averment, which 
shall include such supporting particulars as are 
peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge, and 
on such issue the party relying on such capacity, 
authority, or legal existence, shall establish the 
same on the trial. 
(2) Designation of unknown defendant 
When a party does not know the name of an ad-
verse party, he may state that fact in the plead-
ings, and thereupon such adverse party may be 
designated in any pleading or proceeding by any 
name; provided, that when the true name of such 
adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or pro-
ceeding must be amended accordingly. 
(3) Actions to quiet title; description of in-
terest of unknown parties. In an action to 
quiet title wherein any of the parties are desig-
nated in the caption as "unknown," the pleadings 
may describe such unknown persons as "all other 
€ 
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Ov 
persons unknown, claiming any right, title, es-
tate or interest in, or hen upon the real property 
described in the pleading adverse to the com-
plainant's ownership, or clouding his title 
the, 
Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all 
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity Malice, intent, knowledge, and other 
condition of mind of a person may be averred gener-
Conditions precedent. In pleading the perfor-
mance or occurrence of conditions precedent, it is suf-
ficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent 
have been performed or have occurred A denial of 
performance or occurrence shall be made specifically 
and with particularity, and when so made the party 
pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the 
trial establish the facts showing such performance or 
occurrence 
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an offi-
cial document or act it is sufficient to aver that the 
document was issued or the act done in compliance 
with law 
(e) Judgment In pleading a judgment or decision 
of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judi-
cial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to 
aver the judgment or decision without setting forth 
matter showing jurisdiction to render it A denial of 
jurisdiction shall be made specifically and with par-
ticularity and when so made the party pleading the 
judgment or decision shall establish on the trial all 
controverted jurisdictional facts 
(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the 
sufficiency of a pleading, averments of time and place 
are material and shall be considered like all other 
averments of material matter 
(g) Special damage. When items of special dam-
age are claimed, they shall be specifically stated 
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute 
of limitations it is not necessary to state the facts 
showing the defense but it may be alleged generally 
that the cause of action is barred by the provisions of 
the statute relied on, referring to or describing such 
statute specifically and definitely by section number, 
subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designat-
ing the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to 
identify it If such allegation is controverted, the 
party pleading the statute must establish, on the 
trial, the facts showing that the cause of action is so 
barred 
(1) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a 
private statute of this state, or an ordinance of any 
political subdivision thereof, or a nght denved from 
such statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to 
such statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its 
passage or by its section number or other designation 
m any official publication of the statutes or ordi-
nances The court shall thereupon take judicial notice 
thereof 
el and slander? 
(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is 
necessary in an action for libel or slander to set 
forth any intrinsic facts showing the application 
to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of 
which the action arose, but it is sufficient to state 
generally that the same was published or spoken 
concerning the plaintiff If such allegation is con-
troverted, the party alleging such defamatory 
matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so / 
published or spoken 
(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an ac-
tion for libel or slander, the defendant may allege 
both the truth of the matter charged as defama-
tory and any mitigating circumstances to reduce 
the amount of damages, and, whether he proves 
the justification or not, he may give in evidence 
the mitigating circumstances 
[Rule 10. Form of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Caption; names of parties; other necessary 
information. All pleadings and other papers filed 
with the court shall contain a caption setting forth 
the name of the court, the title of the action, the file 
number, the name of the pleading or other paper, and 
the name, if known, of the judge to whom the case is 
assigned In the complaint, the title of the action 
shall include the names of all the parties, but other 
pleadings and papers need only state the name of the 
first party on each side with an indication that there 
are other parties A party whose name is not known 
shall be designated by any name and the words 
"whose true name is unknown " In an action in rem, 
unknown parties shall be designated as "all unknown 
persons who claim any interest in the subject matter 
of the action " Every pleading and other paper filed 
with the court shall also state the name, address, 
telephone number and bar number of any attorney 
representing the party filing the paper, which infor-
mation shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the 
first page Every pleading shall state the name and 
address of the party for whom it is filed, this informa-
tion shall appear in the lower left-hand corner of the 
last page of the pleading 
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All aver-
ments of claim or defense shall be made in numbered 
paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be 
limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single 
set of circumstances, and a paragraph may be re-
ferred to by number in all succeeding pleadings Each 
claim founded upon a separate transaction or occur-
rence and each defense other than denials shall be 
stated in a separate count or defense whenever a sep-
aration facilitates the clear presentation of the mat-
ters set forth 
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements 
in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a differ-
ent part of the same pleading or in another pleading, 
or in any motion An exhibit to a pleading is a part 
thereof for all purposes 
(d) Paper quality, size, style and printing. All 
pleadings and other papers filed with the court, ex-
cept printed documents or other exhibits, shall be 
typewritten, printed or photocopied in black type on 
good, white, unglazed paper of letter size (8V2' x 11"), 
with a top margin of not less than 2 inches above any 
typed material, a left-hand margin of not less than 1 
inch, a nght-hand margin of not less than one-half 
inch, and a bottom margin of not less than one-half 
inch All typing or printing shall be clearly legible, 
shall be double-spaced, except for matters customar-
ily single-spaced or indented, and shall not be smaller 
than pica size Typing or printing shall appear on one 
side of the page only 
(e) Signature line. Names shall be typed or 
pnnted under all signature lines, and all signatures 
shall be made in permanent black or blue ink 
(D Enforcement by clerk; waiver for pro se par-
ities. The clerk of the court shall examine all plead-
'ings and other papers filed with the court If they are 
not prepared in conformity with this rule, the clerk 
shall accept the filing but may require counsel to sub-
stitute properly prepared papers for nonconforming 
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IN THE DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the intrest of ) RECORD of OBJECTION 1991 
JOSHUA W. FORD j Case Number 717256 
A person under 18 years of age ) 
PREFACE 
I WINFIELD D. SCHOOLCRAFT OBJECT to social workers, guard-
ian ad litems, private attorneys, and foster parents who, 
under color of state law, conspire together for the purpose 
of depriving me of my "LIBERTY INTEREST" in the raising of my 
son Joshua. 
I WINFIELD D. SCHOOLCRAFT OBJECT to; 
.Corruption in the Dept. of Social Services 
•The degeneration of honesty 
•Moral turpitude 
•And just plain wickedness 
INDEX 
I I OBJECT to SLANDER 
II MORGAN 
III I OBJECT to MICHAEL FORD the FABRICATION 
IV I OBJECT to the INVASION of PRIVACY 
V I OBJECT to OFFICIOUS PERVERTING of TRUTH 
VI The CRITTENDENS 
I 
A hearsay recording of the delusions of a mental patient 
as recorded by a person not accreditedt along with other sugg-
estive matter of no substance has been given to Ms* Jeni Mow-
ery, social worker Salt Lake County for the home study of the 
Schoolerafts By Pam Wilson social worker Weber County for the 
purpose of destroying Ms* Moweryfs objectivity* 
I OBJECT to unsubstantiated gossip and slander used in this 
or any other manner* 
I pBJECT to any report influenced by unsubstantiated and 
prejudicial gossip or slander as evidence to the court* 
II 
After checking maps and driving in the car the area of Mor-
gan I found probable cause to believe that anyone living in 
the area called Morgan must live in Morgan County* 
I OBJECT to Mr. Gridley*s statement in court Nov 1 1990. 
while discussing a change of venue, Mr Gridley stated that the 
Crittendens still live in Weber County* I OBJECT to the willi* 
ngness of both of the foster parents John and Colleen Critten-
den to allow Mr* Gridley to prevaricate on there behalf* 
I OBJECT to Stanley Swedin social worker and Jan Arrington 
guardian ad litem being in accord with the Crittendens and Mr* 
Gridley on an issue like this one as it is their responsibility 
to know where ray son Joshua resides* 
III 
I OBJECT to Michael Ford the fabrication still haunting 
the pages of the latest documents, briefs by guardian ad litem 
and the petition by Mr* Gridley for the foster parents* But, 
Michael Ford has not and can not be documented* 
•Michael Ford can not testify 
•Michael Ford can not Take a blood test 
•Michael Ford can not pay child support 
•No one has ever seen Michael Ford 
•No one has ever talked with Michael Ford 
Because , Michael Ford was and still is the fabrication of Web-
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er County officials Stanley Swedin and guardian ad litem Jane 
A. Marquardt. This fabrication is still being carried on, and 
has collected additional conspirators in Jan Arrington the new 
guardian ad litem, Findley P. Gridley attorney for the Critten-
den family, and Para Wilson, social worker• 
To assume for Michael Ford the rights of biological father 
was to deliberately and with purpose create an atmosphere in 
which to set aside the legal presumption of paternity for 
Winfield Schoolcraft. This was and still is fraud. 
Even if the name Michael Ford was to appear in some unsub-
stantiated manner, the person of Michael as seen in the Weber 
County's case against Winfield Schoolcraft is pure fabrication. 
IV 
I OBJECT to invasion of privacy. US Code annotaded amend 
7-14, Zone of Privacy 1,3,4,5,9. Concepts from the ninth Amend-
ment as follows: 
The scope of right to privacy is determined by applying com-
monly accepted standards of social propriety, and include those 
aspects of individuals activities and manner of living that 
would generally be regarded as being of such personal and private 
nature as to belong to himself and to be of no proper concern 
to others, and extends to protecting against intrusion,exposure 
of not only things which might result in actual harm and damage, 
but also to things which might result in shame or humiliation, 
or merely violate ones pride in keeping his private affairs to 
himself. 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY CAM BE VIOLATED BY COMPELLING PUBLIC 
INTEREST ONLY. 
The atmosphere created and the fraudulent rights of Michael 
Ford were used by Weber County people as a tool to invent cause 
to order blood tests of Winfield Schoolcraft denying him his 
legal presumption of paternity of Joshua Ford. 
I OBJECT to the fraudulent invasion of privacy.. I OBJECT to 
any losses of paternal rights by fraudulent means. 
CALIFORNIA accords right to privacy the same constitutional 
status as an inalienable right, on a par with defending life 
and possession of property. 740 P2d 404. 
RIGHT TO BODILY PRIVACY is constitutional protected, and 
violations of that right may be redressed in cause of action un-
der civil rights statute U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 4, 42, U.S.C.A. 
198S Creamer V Rafferty 699 P2d 908. 
V 
I OBJECT to the officious actions of those who would pervert 
the truth. 
In the document titled "Brief of Guardian Ad Litem for J.W.F." 
the fraudulent an fictitious Michael Ford plays a large part, and 
I have dealt with that in section III of this work. However; the 
mentioning of "Michael Ford and Linda Schoolcraft" as if they had 
some union or bond between them is also part of the misrepresen-
tation. Michael Ford and Linda Schoolcraft is found twice on 
page 2 and once on page three. I OBJECT to the implied relation-
ship that did not exist. 
Jan Arrington is not totally responsible for this aspect of 
the case, but she is following the lead of the original con-
spirators, Stanley Swedin and Jane Marquardt. 
In the paragraph on the bottom of page 5, Ms. Arrington says 
that the psychological that Winfield Schoolcraft submitted and 
other material that is too privileged too be seen reveal serious 
concerns regarding Mr. Schoolcrafts fitness as a parent for 
Joshua. In that psychological Dr. Boblitt indicates no reason 
why Mr. Schoolcraft should not raise his son. This 1986 finding 
was confirmed by Dr. Leslie M. Cooper, PH.D. January 10, 1991. 
I OBJECT TO THIS GROSS MISREPRESENTATION BY MS. ARRINGTON. 
VI 
On January 3, 1991 in open court Stanley Swedin testified 
that in a past hearing (in Judge Neweyfs Court) on this same 
case of Joshua W# Fordf the fofeter parents brought a number of 
their friends in support of their interest in Joshua. Stanley 
Swedin did not deny that this group took over for a period of 
time, in that the court room had the atmosphere of a town hall 
meeting. 
Such behavior by people with no legal interest in the procee-
dings is not usually tolerated by the court* 
The Crittendens were not foster parents long enough to claim 
any parent child bonding! and the fact that their party of friends 
were tolerated is evidence that the Crittendens were part of the 
conspiracy from the beginning with Stanley Swedia and Jane 
Marquardt* 
Dated this Day of February, 1991 
Winfield Schoolcraft 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR CUSTODY 
Petition for custody filed Aug 28, 1986 
First Dist. Juvenile Court 
2550 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden Utah 8W>2 
RE: Joshua W. Ford 
By fc For; 
Winfield D. Schoolcraft, Presumed Father• 
Psychological Evaluation hy; 
Wnu Edgar Boblet, Ph.D. 
720 - 13th Street - Suite D 
Modesto California 9335k 
{ 
WM. EDGAR BOBLITT, PH.D. 
INCORPORATED 
C L I N I C A L PSYCHOLOGIST 
(PV 3 6 3 8 ) 
DlPLOMATE A A B M 
7 2 0 - 1 3 T H STREET - S U I T E D 
MODESTO, C A L I F O R N I A 9 5 3 5 4 
2 0 9 / 5 2 2 - 9 3 2 0 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION 
NAME: Winfield D. Schoolcraft 
DATE OF BIRTH: 12-8-37 AGE: 47 DATE TESTED: 9-17-86 
REFERRED BY: Self 
DATE OF REPORT: 9-23-86 
TESTS ADMINISTERED: Structured Interview, the Amnions Quick Test 
of Intelligence, and the Minnesota Multi-
phasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: Mr. Schoolcraft states that his wife 
Linda left him when she was two months 
pregnant and went to the state of Utah where she gave birth 
to his son, Joshua. As yet Mr. Schoolcraft has not seen the 
boy. He is eager to achieve custody and raise his child. He 
states that the child was abandoned by the mother in the state 
of Utah. He states that his wife has severe problems with 
alcoholism and that she has suffered from epileptoid symptoms. 
He states that they were married for 14 months before the child 
was born and that they remained married though he does not 
know her current whereabouts. This is the second marriage for 
Mr. Schoolcraft. Mr. Schoolcraft states that he has been 
employed as a mechanical engineer and was recently laid off from 
his work at a local cannery. He ia going to Springfield 
Oregon where his parents and brother live and will seek work there. 
He is also expecting that his mother will help provide child care 
when he achieves custody of his child. 
Mr. Schoolcraft states that he was born in Oakland but that his 
earliest memories are of Modesto, California, from the age of 
two years and onward. He states that he is the eldest in a 
sibship of two. He states that he enjoyed good childhood health. 
He states that both of his parents are living and their marriage 
is intact. He states that school was easy for him and that he had 
no academic problems. He states that after graduating high school 
he enlisted in the United States Air Force where he was an 
instructor in basic electronics. He was discharged three years 
later with the rank of Airman Third Class. He states that he 
enjoyed teaching. He states that at the age of 23 he married his 
first wife and at that time he was employed as a railroad switch-
man. The marriage lasted 20 years and there were three children. 
He states that she was unfaithful to him and that she had a 
tendency to drink. Mr. Schoolcraft states that he has not used 
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alcohol since his Air Force days and that he quit smoking 12 
years ago. All of the children from his first marriage are 
grown and living independently. He states that after the 
dissolution of his first marriage he worked as a mechanical 
engineer in the Modesto area and met his second wife three years 
after his divorce. He states that he will eventualy seek a 
divorce from his second wife because of her difficulties with 
alcoholism. 
Mr. Schoolcraft states that he remains in generally good health 
though he suffers some back problems. He states that he sleeps 
well and has a good appetite. His favorite activities include 
tinkering with electronic equipment and inventing electronic 
aparatus. He states that he has always liked children. He states 
that currently he is rooming with a cousin in Modesto. He has 
some female friends who have children. He states that his 
daughter and grandchildren are here in town and that he visits 
with them. 
BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATIONS: On the day of testing Mr. Schoolcraft 
was well dressed and well groomed and 
resembled his stated age of 47. He is tall and slender. He spoke 
employing a good vocabulary and appeared to be of above average 
intelligence. He seems to have a wide range of interest. He 
appears to have appropriate social skills. He was oriented with 
regard to time, place, and person. His speech was clear and 
no abnormal thought content was elicited. He related easily to 
the examiner and appeared to be trying to do his best on the various 
test tasks. 
TEST RESULTS: 
Ammons Quick Test of Intelligence 
Mental Age = 19 plus 
IQ = 110 
MMPI: See Below 
TEST INTERPRETATION: Results of the Ammons Quick Test of Intelli-
gence indicate that Mr. Schoolcraft is func-
tioning in the bright average range of intellience classifica-
tion when compared to other Americans his age. His intelligence 
score is at the 75th percentile indicating that his intelligence 
is higher than that of 75% of the population of American adults. 
Mr. Schoolcraft's responses to the MMPI indicate a valid profile. 
It is clear that he understood the test items. There was no 
indication of psychopathology. The profile further indicates that 
he is slightly more concerned than the average person about his 
physical health. It is also apparent that he views his life with 
an average mixture of optimism and pessimism. There were also 
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indications that he is mildly independent and nonconformist but 
that he conforms reasonably to social codes and mores. He has 
a combination of practical and theoretical interests. He appears 
to be normally outgoing and gregarious. 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Mr. Schoolcraft appears to be a man 
of somewhat above average intelligence 
who has no significant psychopathology. There seems to be an 
adequate balance in his interests,both theoretically, and social-
ly. He is mildly nonconformist but is capable of conforming 
social norms and mores. This examiner sees no reason why he 
would have undue difficulty in raising his son. 
Wni. E^gTa1^qWKtt7 
Licensed Cidmical Psychologist 
PV3658 
#U40 
WEB:j k 
DAVID L McCANN, M.D.* 
General Peychiatrtot 
Certified by the American Board of 
Psychiatry 4 Neurology, Inc. 
Medical Oireclor, 
CPC Otympus View Hospital 
• A Professional Corporation 
ANOREW W. FISHER, M.D. 
General Psychiatrist 
Certified by the American Board of 
Psychiatry & NauroJogy, Inc. 
LESLIE M. COOPER. Ph.D. 
Clinical Psychology 
Clinical Profassof of Psychology 
JOHN B. ELLISON. ACSW 
Licensed Clinical Social Worker 
Individual, Family, Group Therapy, Hypnotherapy 
REPORT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION 
CONFIDENTIAL 
NAME: BELLE & WINFIELD SCHOOLCRAFT DATE OF REPORT: 01/10/91 
SEX: MALE DATE OF TESTING:12/31/90 
Winfield D, Schoolcraft, a 53-year-old white male, and his 
wife of two years, Belle M. Schoolcraft, a 61-year-old white 
female were seen for a psychological evaluation of their 
personality functioning upon the presentation of a court order 
from the District Juvenile Court for Weber County, State of Utah 
filed January 3, 1991 in the matter of Joshua W. Ford, a person 
under eighteen years of age. Mr. and Mrs. Schoolcraft were 
separately administered the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory (MMPI) on December 31, 1990, and seen in separate 
interviews on January 7, 1991. 
Winfield D. Schoolcraft 
Interview 
He was appropriately dressed and groomed. He did not appear 
to be anxious or agitated but spoke firmly and with conviction. 
He appeared to be comfortable with the interviewer. He not only 
answered the questions, but spontaneously elaborated upon his 
responses, and volunteered additional information. He reacted 
socially in an appropriate manner. He employed an above-average 
vocabulary, and the topics discussed suggested that he has a wide 
range of interests, hobbies, and skills. No abnormal thought 
content nor abnormal mannerisms or behavior were observed. 
He related much of the history set forth in a previous 
psychological evaluation dated September 23, 1986 by William Edgar 
Boblitt relating to Mr. Schoolcraft's interest and attempt to gain 
custody of Joshua W. Ford, whom he believes and claims to be his 
^ • • a m , 
MOUNTAIN WEST 
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATES 
General Psychiatric Evaluation and Treatment 
Biological and Neuropsychiatry 
Psychological Teatlng and Evaluation 
Individual Psychotherapy 
Conjoint and Famtfy Therapy 
Group Psychotherapy 
Stress Management & Clinical Meditation 
Alcohol A Drug Dependency Treatment 
Workers' Compensation Evaluations 
Behavior Modification for Weight Control 
Image Therapy 
Hypnotherapy 
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son. That history will not be again repeated here. 
He reported that since that time he was divorced from his 
second wife, Linda. He was married to his present wife, Belle, on 
November 9, 1988 in Eugene, Oregon. They moved to Utah, and he 
has been remodeling an apartment for them to live in. He has 
found employment through temporary services, but anticipates that 
he may soon be permanently employed by OEC Diasonics. He reported 
that he can obtain employment more easily here than in Oregon or 
California, and anticipates remaining living in this area. 
He indicated a strong moral, intellectual, and emotional 
commitment to obtaining custody of "his multi-racial dark-skinned 
son, Joshua.M While the first impression obtained in hearing him 
talk about this commitment is one of an obsessive and almost 
irrational drive, when understood in the light of his personality 
dynamics, I believe this impression is incorrect. He sincerely 
adheres to what might be termed fundamentalist religious beliefs. 
He has a strong adherence to the values of supporting, caring and 
being responsible for family members. 
He claimed to be in good health, although he is reported to 
suffer with some back problems. He reported having a high energy 
level, and "if he had a fault it would probably be that he could 
easily be a workaholic." He has three children from a previous 
marriage and 3 grandchildren, so is not unfamiliar with the 
responsibilities involved in raising a child. He denied the use 
of alcohol, drugs, or tobacco. He denied any serious illnesses or 
disabilities. When asked in detail, he reported none of the 
symptoms of depression, anxiety, paranoia, or other abnormal 
emotional conditions, nor were any such symptoms observed during 
the interview. I detected no prejudices or biases that might 
suggest a problem toward caring for a multi-racial child. 
Test Results 
The (MMPI) was administered to Mr. Schoolcraft on December 
31, 1990. The validity scales indicated that he was cooperative, 
understood the instructions, and answered the questions in a 
consistent manner. The profile was valid for clinical 
interpretation. The clinical scale profile did not correspond to 
a two-point code typical of most adults receiving clinical 
evaluations. Therefore, this report is based on single scale 
scores of adults receiving similar evaluations. 
The profile is an essentially normal profile indicating no 
psychiatric, psychological, or emotional pathology. The following 
interpretive statements are suggestive of styles of responding 
that are well within a normal range. 
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He is uncompromising with very high and rigid standards of 
conduct* He tends to avoid unacceptable feelings, impulses, and 
behaviors. He tends to view himself, others, and the world in a 
somewhat simplistic manner (e.g., good-bad). He subscribes to a 
number of fundamentalist religious beliefs, and presents himself 
as a very religious person. He is likely to approach new 
situations with caution, feeling vulnerable to being criticized 
and judged. He is not psychologically minded, and may be 
resistant to psychological interpretations of his functioning. 
He tends to be somewhat overly-sensitivity to the words and 
actions of others and may, at time, be somewhat suspicious. This 
can sometimes lead to power struggles within family and work 
settings. 
He tends to be restless, independent, and occasionally (from 
other*s point of view) nonconforming. He seek variety, and 
stimulation. He is capable of being appropriately assertive and 
of identifying and expressing anger in a modulated and 
appropriate manner. He appears verbal, likable, and competitive. 
He is generally free of emotional turmoil. 
He is vigilant about protecting himself from physical or 
emotional dangers. He appears hopeful, wishful, optimistic, 
extroverted, and enthusiastic. Like most people, he has a 
persistent (but disguised?) need to be liked and accepted by 
others and will typically emphasize the good or "nice" aspects of 
life to the exclusion of the negative, unpleasant or harmful. 
Like other men with similar profiles, he balances interests 
in sports, physical activity, and practical matters with art, 
music, literature, and science. Under normal conditions, he can 
enjoy indoor as well as outdoor activities, both as a participant 
and as an observer. He can be sensitive, inquisitive, 
introspective, conversational and verbally expressive. 
He generally demonstrates an average degree of comfort and 
ability in social situations. 
Belle M. Schoolcraft 
Interview 
She also was appropriately dressed and groomed. She was 
pleasant, cooperative, responsive, and friendly throughout the 
interview. She was somewhat less forceful in the interview, and 
gave the impression that she was being cooperative with the 
procedures in support of her husband. Nonetheless, she presented 
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herself in an assertive manner. No abnormal thought content nor 
abnormal mannerisms or behavior were observed. 
She said that she had met Mr. Schoolcraft at a Pentecostal 
church, and that their spiritual experiences have been very 
meaningful and important to them. She indicated strong support of 
her husband's attempt to obtain custody of Mhis child.11 She 
reported having been married twice before, and had six children, 
all of whom are now grown, and 15 grandchildren. She stated that 
she is, consequently, not unfamiliar with what is involved in 
raising a child. She is aware of the responsibilities associated 
with obtaining custody, and spoke with candor and awareness of 
the potential relevance of her and her husband's age and their 
stage of life, yet manifested a sincere excitement and acceptance 
of the challenge that it might bring. 
She claimed to be in good health, having had a thorough 
physical examination two years ago, with no findings of any major 
physical problems. She noted that she feels she has abundance 
energy and stamina for someone her age. She said that she enjoys 
being busy, and not only sews and cooks, and keeps the house, but 
also has actively supported her husband in business ventures. She 
denied any serious illnesses or disabilities. I detected no 
prejudices or biases that might have suggested a problem in caring 
for a multi-racial child. When asked in detail, she reported none 
of the symptoms of depression, anxiety, paranoia, or other 
abnormal emotional conditions, nor were any such symptoms observed 
during the interview. 
Test Results 
The (MMPI) was administered to Mrs. Schoolcraft on December 
31, 1990. The validity scales indicated that she was cooperative, 
understood the instructions, and answered the questions in a 
consistent manner. The profile was valid for clinical 
interpretation. The clinical scale profile did not correspond to 
a two-point code typical of most adults receiving clinical 
evaluations. Therefore, this report is based on single scale 
scores of adults receiving similar evaluations. 
The profile is an essentially normal profile indicating no 
psychiatric, psychological, or emotional pathology. The following 
interpretive statements are suggestive of styles of responding 
that are well within a normal range. 
She is usually candid and adaptable with a resilient 
ego-defense system, but an uncertain self-concept and only 
partially effective coping mechanisms. 
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Like other women with this profile, she is able to balance 
practicality with idealism. She enjoys talking about ideas, 
feelings, and accomplishments, but has little interest in 
mechanical objects or in how things actually work. Relationships 
are very important to her. She prefers gentle and sensitive 
companions who can relate to the complexity of her feelings. She 
enjoys beauty, and finds it important to be attractive. She is 
easily upset by the aggressive actions of others, and seeks 
protection against physical danger. She becomes fearful and angry 
if she feel overpowered by others. She can enjoy a variety of 
activities but will not take risks that might physically harm her 
or be painful. 
She generally demonstrates an average degree of comfort and 
ability in social situations, although she may, at times, appear 
somewhat reserved, modest, and self-effacing. 
Summary 
The present MMPI results for Mr. Schoolcraft are not 
significantly different from the results obtained in 1986, and 
consequently the same conclusions made then are valid at this 
time. I detected no significant psychopathology in either Mr. or 
Mrs. Schoolcraft. I discovered no reasons of a psychological or 
emotional nature why they should not be able to raise Joshua if 
they were awarded custody. 
WINFIELD D. SCHOOLCRAFT A COMPLAINT alleging 
6 75 Green Street misconduct 
S.L.C., Ut. 84102 
Phone 537-1331 
MR. JACK GREEN 
Liability Management 
120 North, 200 West 
S.L.C*, Ut. 
Phone 538-4466 
Mr. Jack Green: 
I am attaching to this letter some documents which include 
my Civil Rights Complaint to the Federal Court and others. 
The basic point of view which I hold, and I am sure that I 
would not be alone in this, is that it is misconduct for a 
public official to fabricate false testimony for any court, for 
the purpose of removing a child (Joshua) from the marital situ-
ation in which he was born. The man, Stanley Swedin claimed to be 
the father of Joshua was called Michael Ford; and even if this 
name should appear in some unsubstantiated manner, the person and 
rights of Michael Ford were and still are the fabrication of 
Stanley Swedin and Jane Marquardt, because Michael Ford cannot 
testify, take a blood test, pay child support, be talked with, or 
be seen. To assume for Michael Ford the rights of biological 
father was to deliberately and with purpose create an atmospere 
in which to set aside the legal presumption of paternity for Win-
field Schoolcraft. This was and still is fraud. 
The foster parent, John Crittenden, testified in open court 
February 14, 1991, Weber County Juvenile, that he and his wife 
became foster parents for the sole purpose of adopting my son 
Joshua. The Crittendens became foster parents in 1986, several 
years ago. Stanley Swedin also ^ testified that he was aware of the 
intentions of the Crittendens toward my son. 
The State of Utah, through its1 representatives in Weber 
County, has acted with a bias in favor of the Crittendens; who 
now appear to have legal standing because of the long delays in 
the processes involved. 
I thank you for considering this and the attached documents, 
as I am seeking any remedy possible. 
Dated the 5th day of March 1991 
WINFIELD D. SCHOOLCRAFT 
RE: Stan Swedin, DFS 
2540 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Ut. 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES 
OFFICE OF LIABILITY MANAGEMENT 
120 North 200 West Room 304 
PO Box 45500 
Salt Lake City Utah 84145 0500 
(801)538 4178 
March 14, 1991 
Wenfield D. Schoolcraft 
675 Green Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Dear Mr. Schoolcraft: 
I have reviewed the material you gave me when we met on March 5th 
and have researched some of the case files. The Division of Family 
Services has a responsibility in a situation such as yours to 
develop the best long-term care for the child. Since the courts 
have repeatedly ruled that your interests are no greater than those 
of the foster parents, the best long-term care for the child is to 
remain with the foster parents. The court's ruling that you are 
not the biological father probably could have been made without the 
blood tests since the child (Joshua) is mixed race (black) and both 
you and Linda are Caucasian. A fact you neglected to mention in 
our discussion. 
It appears that Division of Family Services' representatives acted 
prudently in placing the abandoned child, whose parents could not 
be located, in state care in a foster home. The caseworker's only 
lead for possible paternity was a name (Michael Jay Ford) which 
appeared on an application for assistance completed by Linda 
Schoolcraft in August of 1985 (before the child was born). After 
the child was placed in state custody, caseworkers searched the 
records and found Michael Ford's name but were unable to locate 
him. They were unable to find anything else to indicate who the 
father might be. Your name did not appear on any documentation 
nor, as I understand, on the birth certificate. When you appeared, 
there was sufficient reason for caseworkers to question your 
biological and legal status for custody as well as your ability as 
an unemployed/underemployed older single parent to care for the 
child. 
Norman H Bangerter 
Governor 
Norman G Angus 
Executive Director 
Jack L Green 
Director 
on o n i IQI n n n n r t i mit\ / o m n l m / P r 
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Since you have filed a lawsuit against the caseworkers involved, 
determination may be resolved by the court as to whether or not the 
caseworkers did indeed act properly. I feel it would be 
inappropriate for me to comment further until the lawsuit is 
settled. 
Sincerely, 
J&ck L. Green 
/ d i r e c t o r 
JLGrplp 
WINFIELD D. SCHOOLCRAFT 
675 Green St. 
S.L.C. Ut. 84102 
Phone 537-1331 
The OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL 
645 S 200 E 
S.L.C. Ut. 84111 
Phone 531-9110 
A COMPLAINT alleging 
misconduct 
RE; Jane Marquardt Atty. 
2661 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden Ut. 84401 
Phone 621-3662 
1. In 1986 Jane Marquardt introduced much talk about a person she 
and Stan Swedin of the Dept. of Family Services called Michael Ford. 
This was done in THE DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY. 
2. Michael Ford was called the biological father of Joshua Ford, 
son of Linda Schoolcraft, who was my wife at the time. 
3. Paragraph 8 of the MEMORANDUM DECISION signed by Judge Robert L. 
Newey in Weber County February 10th, 1987, reads in its entirety as 
follows; 
"8. That Linda Schoolcraft advised Mr. Swedin that a Michael Ford 
was the father of Joshua Ford on her application for Public Assist-
ance." 
4. In open court Feb 14th, 1991, before Judge Van Dyke of Weber 
County Juvenile Court, Stan Swedin testified that he never met Linda* 
And to this day in any court, no document supporting the existence 
of Michael Ford has been filed. 
5. Jane Marquardt used the fraudulent Michael Ford as a tool 
for probable cause, to have the Juvenile Court order blood tests 
thus depriving me of my legal presumption of paternity. 
6. Moreover; After Judge Neweyfs decision that Michael Ford was 
hearsay, Jane Marquardt used the fraudulent Ford before the Court of 
Appeals, and the Utah Supreme Court to influence their decision. 
763 P.2d 1217 (Utah App* 1988) J.W.F. v, Schoolcraft 
7. Attached are some documents which include my Civil Rights Comp-
laint to the Federal Court. 
Dated this %# 
• > * 
_day of February, 1991 
/^s&& 
WINFIELD D. SCHOOLCRAFT 
Utah §tateBar 
Office of Bar Counsel 
645 South 200 East • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3834 
Telephone (801)531-9110 • FAX (801)531-0660 
April 23, 1991 
Winfield Schoolcraft 
675 Green Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Complaint against Jane Marquardt 
Dear Mr. Schoolcraft: 
I have now had the opportunity to fully review the 
file with regard to your complaint against Jane 
Marquardt. As I do not find that she has violated any 
of her ethical obligations as an attorney, I am 
dismissing your complaint. 
We appreciate your communication with our office. 
Sincerely, 
Stephen A. Trost 
Bar Counsel 
SAT/lar:BB 
cc: Jane Marquardt 
AO 450 (Rev. 5/85) Judgment in a Civil Case ® 'J'.'J. T p i ^ - , .^URf 
mitres 
1&nittb ^ ta ies district (goixv^i1^ 
Central DISTRICT OF —Utah-
WINFIELD DUANE SCHOOLCRAFT, 
Plaintiff 
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE 
v. 
UTAH STATE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES, et al., 
Defendants. CASE NUMBER: 
91-NC-5W 
Q Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury, The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered 
its verdict. 
C Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a 
decision has been rendered. 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED 
that the plaintiff's cause of action is dismissed with prejudice and on the merits and 
judgment entered for the defendants. 
June 11,1991 Markus B. Zimmer 
Date Clerk 
FILED 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
0CC271991 
M T Noomn 
State of Utah, in the 
Interest of J.W.F., a person 
under 18 years of age, 
Petition of 
Winfield D. Schoolcraft. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 910163-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 27, 1991) 
Second District Juvenile, Weber County 
The Honorable Stephen A. VanDyke 
Attorneys: Winfield D. Schoolcraft, Salt Lake City, Appellant 
Pro Se 
Jan Arrington, Ogden, Guardian Ad Litem for J.W.F. 
Findley P. Gridley and Robert K. Hunt, Ogden, for 
J.W.F.'s Foster Parents 
Carol L.C. Verdoia, Salt Lake City, for State of Utah 
Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Jackson. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
This case is before us following a remand by the Utah 
Supreme Court to the juvenile court for a determination of 
whether it would be in the child's best interests for appellant 
Schoolcraft to have custody of J.W.F. See In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 
710 (Utah 1990). Schoolcraft appeals the juvenile court's 
decision that it would not be in the child's best interests for 
him to have custody. We affirm. 
Inasmuch as the facts of this case have been adequately and 
fully discussed in the previous opinions of this court and the 
supreme court, we give but a brief factual background. J.W.F. 
was born to Schoolcraft's wife, Linda Schoolcraft, while they 
were separated. They had been separated for a year prior to the 
birth. Schoolcraft became aware of J.W.F.'s existence 
approximately one year after the birth when he learned that the 
State had filed a neglect and abandonment petition against Linda 
Schoolcraft and Michael Ford, the putative father of J.W.F.1 
Schoolcraft then filed a petition in juvenile court seeking 
custody of J.W.F., alleging that he was the presumed father 
because he was still legally married to J.W.F.'s mother at the 
time of the birth. 
The juvenile court found that Schoolcraft was not the 
biological father of J.W.F. based upon a blood test and the fact 
that J.W.F. is partly of African ancestry while both appellant 
and Linda Schoolcraft are of Anglo-Saxon ancestry. The juvenile 
court ruled that because Schoolcraft was not the biological 
father of J.W.F., he did not have standing to seek custody and 
therefore dismissed his petition. 
This court affirmed the juvenile court's denial of standing 
but the Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that Schoolcraft had 
standing to seek custody as J.W.F.'s stepfather. The supreme 
court remanded the matter to the juvenile court to "determine 
what custody arrangement would serve the best interests of J.W.F. 
and act accordingly." Id. at 716. On remand, the juvenile court 
held that it would be in the best interests of J.W.F. to be 
placed in the permanent custody of J.W.F.'s foster parents in 
whose care he had been since the juvenile court ruled shortly 
after his birth that he had been abandoned. Schoolcraft now 
appeals that ruling. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
It is well settled that we give gieat deference to the trial 
court when it makes a custody determination in divorce 
proceedings. 
We should note, also, that the 
trial court is given particularly 
broad discretion in the area of 
child custody i 
determination of the "best 
interests of the child" frequently 
turns on numerous factors which the 
1. Schoolcraft argues that the juvenile court, this court, and 
the supreme court, have all erred because the biological father 
has never been produced or legally proven to exist. This 
argument misses the point upon which this case now rests. In the 
initial trial proceeding, the juvenile court found that appellant 
was not the biological father, This finding was affirmed by this 
court and by the supreme court. The identity of J.W.F.'s 
biological father is therefore no longer relevant t3 thp 
discussion of whether Schoolcraft, is T W.F.'s legal stepfather 
at birth, should now have custody. 
o 
trial court is best suited to 
assess, given its proximity to the 
parties and the circumstances. 
Only where trial court action is so 
flagrantly unjust as to constitute 
an abuse of discretion should the 
appellate forum interpose its own 
judgment. 
Jorgensen v. Jorqensen, 599 P.2d 510, 511-12 (Utah 1979). This 
same deference is due a juvenile court's custody decisions for 
the same reasons. Therefore, the juvenile court's determination 
of what is in the best interests of J.W.F. will not be overturned 
by this court on appeal unless "the evidence clearly shows that 
the custody determination was not in the best interests of the 
child or that the trial court misapplied applicable principles of 
law." Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 425 (Utah 1986). 
ANALYSIS 
In essence, Schoolcraft challenges the juvenile court's 
holding based upon his claim that he had a right to custody of 
J.W.F. and that the juvenile court should not have awarded 
custody to the foster parents unless Schoolcraft was found unfit 
to be a parent.2 Schoolcraft argues that since the juvenile 
court found that fl[t]he Schoolcrafts are free of any significant 
mental or psychopathological disorders, and appear capable of 
raising a child, in spite of the age differences between 
themselves and J.W.F.,11 he was found to be a fit prospective 
parent. Schoolcraft then concludes that the trial court erred in 
not granting him custody. 
Schoolcraft's argument fails because, as the supreme court 
expressly declared, he did not have any "presumption of 
entitlement of custody,11 by virtue of his status as legal 
stepfather. In re J.W.F.. 799 P.2d at 716. As the juvenile 
court correctly concluded, the foster family and Schoolcraft were 
on "equal footing to seek legal custody, neither having any 
2. Schoolcraft raises additional issues which were previously 
decided contrary to Schoolcraft's position either by this court, 
see In re J.W.F.. 763 P.2d 1217 (Utah App. 1988), or the supreme 
court, see In re J.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710. Inasmuch as the rulings 
on those issues have become the law of the case, we do not 
revisit them. Dixon v. Stoddard, 765 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1988) 
(decision of supreme court becomes law of the case on remand). 
Schoolcraft also raises several other issues, but inasmuch as the 
supreme court remanded only the issue of what custody 
arrangements would be in J.W.F.'s best interests, we limit our 
discussion to that issue. 
QI m ^i-r^A 
greater legal right under color of law than the other to have the 
child, and custody should therefore be granted on the basis of 
what is in the best interest of the child." In cases such as 
this, where more than one set of prospective parents may seek 
permanent custody of the same child, there need not be any 
disqualification of one set or the other as being unfit before 
custody is awarded. Both sets of prospective parents may be able 
to provide a fine home for the child. The question for the trier 
of fact is simply, "In which of two acceptable possible homes 
would it be in the best interests of the child to be placed?" 
The juvenile court looked at all the relevant factors brought to 
its attention and made this truly difficult and weighty decision, 
which decision we will not lightly disturb. 
The issue properly before this court then is whether the 
juvenile court abused its discretion in holding that it was in 
the best interests of J.W.F. that he live with the foster 
parents. The juvenile court gave the following reasons, among 
others, for its decision: 
[The foster parents] are younger and 
better equipped to raise an active young 
child than Schoolcrafts are. They have 
better income, greater demonstrated 
ability over a long period of home life, 
and a close bond with J.W.F., who has 
known no one else as parents. Advantages 
the [foster parents] offer include good 
health care; greater familiarity with 
J.W.F. as his primary care providers; 
extensive family resources, including 
association for J.W.F, with a mixed-race 
child near to J.W.F.'s age who was 
adopted by [the foster mother's] sister 
and who is in the role of a "cousin" to 
J.W.F. To change custody now would be 
substantially disruptive and damaging to 
J.W.F. 
The forgoing reasons appear particularly relevant to a 
proper determination of what would be in J.W.F.'s best interests, 
Schoolcraft does not argue otherwise. Nor does he show what harm 
would occur to J.W.F. by being placed in the custody of the 
foster parents. Inasmuch as Schoolcraft has failed to show how 
the evidence "clearly shows that the custody determination was 
not in the best interests of the child or that the trial court 
A 
misapplied applicable principles of law, 
we affirm the trial court's decision. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
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